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Generational angst-the  fear that we are bequeathing enormous fiscal bills to 
our children-is  global, affecting countries as diverse as Japan and Brazil. The 
angst is rooted in three facts. First, the affected countries have spent decades 
accumulating large official liabilities. Second, they have spent the same time 
accumulating even larger unofficial liabilities. And third, they are aging quite 
rapidly, leaving relatively few workers to pay the government’s bills. Genera- 
tional accounting, as we have seen, helps countries confront, although not nec- 
essarily allay, their generational anxieties. It spells out how much each genera- 
tion will pay under different policy scenarios, including trying to maintain the 
status quo. 
For most of the 17 countries considered in this book, generational account- 
ing’s message is highly unpleasant. The reason is that most of these countries 
are running fiscal policies that if left unchanged will sentence their children to 
sky-high rates of net taxation. This chapter documents this contention. It com- 
pares the countries’ generational accounts, the role of demographics in produc- 
ing their generational imbalances, and the policies they could adopt to achieve 
generational balance-a  situation in which future generations face the same 
lifetime net tax rates as current newborns. In drawing these comparisons, this 
chapter provides an overview of  each country’s generational policy. But  it 
leaves to each country chapter the task of describing recent fiscal events, dis- 
cussing the generational impacts of past and pending fiscal actions, and identi- 
fying data sources underlying the generational accounts. 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff is professor of economics at  Boston University and a research associate 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Willi Leibfritz is head of the Department for Mac- 
roeconomic and Fiscal Studies at if0 Institute for Economic Research. 
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4.1  Methodology and Assumptions 
As detailed in chapter 3, generational accounts are defined as the present 
value of taxes paid minus transfer payments received (net taxes) that individ- 
uals of  different annual cohorts  (generations) pay on average over their re- 
maining lifetimes. The accounts consider only future net taxes; that is, they do 
not include taxes that have been paid or any transfers that have been received 
before the base year. Thus among living generations only the newborn gener- 
ation (the generation born in the base year) has a generational account con- 
sisting of its entire lifetime net tax payments, measured in present value. 
Generational accounts are based on the government’s intertemporal  budget 
constraint,  which  implies  that  the  sum  of  future  government  consumption 
spending has to be equal to the sum of all future net taxes (taxes minus trans- 
fers all in present value terms) plus current government net wealth. The imbal- 
ance in existing generational policy is calculated by assuming that future gen- 
erations (those born after the base year) pay, in the form of net taxes, all of the 
government’s bills left unpaid by current generations. This assumption ensures 
that the difference between generational accounts of  the newborn generation 
and generational accounts of future generations reflects the policy adjustment 
required to satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. 
If future generations face, on a growth-adjusted basis, a higher lifetime net 
tax burden than do current newborns, current policy is neither sustainable nor 
generationally balanced. The same is true if future generations face a smaller 
growth-adjusted lifetime net tax burden than do current newborns. However, 
in this case, generational balance can be achieved by reducing the fiscal burden 
facing current generations rather than the other way around. The calculation of 
the extent of generational imbalance is an informative counterfactual-not  a 
likely policy scenario. Hence, we also entertain alternative means of achieving 
generational balance that do not involve foisting all the adjustment on future 
generations. 
Generational  accounting  depends  on  various  assumptions,  in  particular 
about future economic developments and demographic trends. In the base-case 
generational accounts presented here, labor productivity is assumed to grow at 
1.5 percent per year and all future flows of real taxes and real transfer payments 
are discounted at a 5 percent real rate. We also present results for higher and 
lower productivity  growth and discount rates.’  Demographic projections are 
generally taken from national sources. The base-case fiscal policy considered 
is that prevailing at the time of the writing of the respective chapters, 1996 and 
1. The calculations are also camed out for 1 percent and 2 percent productivity growth. Labor 
productivity increased on average in OECD member countries by  1.8 percent during the 1980s 
and by  1 percent during the first half of the 1990s. There are different views about how aging of 
populations affects productivity. Some argue that aging slows technical progress as innovation is 
less profitable in  shrinking markets  and as the aging society loses “dynamism” (Simon  1981; 75  An International Comparison of Generational Accounts 
the first half of  1997. The authors who wrote these chapters chose the data to 
be used in their accounts. They also produced their accounts themselves, using, 
in most cases, the original generational accounting software package devel- 
oped by Alan Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale, and Laurence Kotlikoff. 
In the first incarnations of generational accounting, educational expenditure 
was treated as a government purchase rather than as a transfer payment to those 
on whose behalf the expenditure is made. This treatment followed the classifi- 
cation of educational expenditures of the U.S. National Income and Product 
Accounts. To maintain comparability with previous work, we present genera- 
tional accounts treating educational expenditure both as a government pur- 
chase (case A) and as transfer payments (case B). 
4.2  The Demographic Transition 
Table 4.1 considers the demographic trends under way  in each of  our 17 
countries. The first four columns show projected population growth rates for 
this decade and the next three. The next two columns compare the elderly 
shares of the population in 1990 and 2030, and the last two columns compare 
1990 and 2020 elderly dependency ratios-the  ratio of those aged 65 or older 
to those aged 15 to 64. 
In this decade, each country’s annual population growth rate is positive. But 
each is projected to decline dramatically over time. Indeed, in the 2020s, 6 of 
the 17 countries will experience negative population growth. In Brazil, Argen- 
tina, and Thailand population growth is projected to decline from 1 to 1.5 per- 
cent per year in  the 1990s to 0.6 to 0.7 percent per year after 2020. In the 
United States, Canada, Australia, and New  Zealand, population growth will 
decline from this decade’s rates of  0.9 to 1.2 percent per year to 0.3 to 0.4 
percent per year after 2020. Starting at the turn of  the century, the German, 
Italian, and Belgian populations will actually begin to shrink. Thailand, whose 
elderly currently make up only 4 percent of the population, will have a popula- 
tion that is 11 percent old in 2030. 
Of the 17 countries, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands will be the 
oldest in 2030, with over one-quarter of their populations in the ranks of the 
elderly. In these countries as well as Belgium, there will be over 4  oldsters for 
every 10 workers (working-age persons). In Germany and Italy, there will be 
almost 5 oldsters per 10 workers. In another 9 countries-the  United States, 
Wattenberg 1987), while others find empirical evidence that innovation increases when labor gets 
scarce (Habakkuk 1962; Cutler et al. 1990). 
Discount rates convert projected annual flows into net present values. A higher discount rate 
would reduce the net present value of future flows compared with a lower discount rate, and the 
longer the time period under consideration, the greater the sensitivity of the results to the choice 
of the discount rate. As explained in chapter 2, there are differing views about how to choose an 
appropriate discount rate for this analysis. The range of discount rates used in this study (3,5,  and 
7 percent) encompasses differing interpretations of the appropriate choice of the discount rate and 
permits sensitivity analysis of the discount rate assumption. Table 4.1  Demographic lknds 
Elderly Share of the  Elderly Dependency 
Population Growth Rates (% per year)  Population"  Ratiob 


























































































































































Source: World Bank, World Bank Projections (Washington, D.C.,  1994). 
"Population aged 65 or older as a percentage of  total population. 
bPopulation aged 65 or older as a percentage of  population aged 15 to 64. 77  An International Comparison of Generational Accounts 
Canada, Australia, Denmark, New  Zealand, France, Norway,  Portugal, and 
Sweden-there  will be between 3 and 4 oldsters per 10 workers. And in Thai- 
land, Argentina, and Brazil, there will be roughly 2 oldsters for every  10 
workers. 
4.3  Generational Accounts of Living Generations 
When people are young, they receive transfers (e.g., child benefits or educa- 
tional allowances) and pay consumption taxes. During their working lives, they 
continue to pay consumption taxes but also pay taxes on their labor and capital 
income in the form of personal income taxes and payroll taxes. The present 
value of  a generation’s remaining lifetime net tax payments-its  generational 
account-is  generally highest for generations at the beginning of their work 
spans, as it does not include child and educational benefits received in youth. 
When workers reach older ages, the sum of future net tax payments tends to 
decline as future transfer receipts (e.g., pensions) gain in importance compared 
with future tax payments. Between ages 50 and 60, future transfer receipts 
generally start to exceed future tax payments so that generational accounts be- 
come negative (net transfers). The absolute amount of net transfers declines 
during retirement as the remaining lifetime shortens. 
Table 4.2 shows the generational accounts of each of our 17 countries. Each 
set of accounts exhibits a hump-shaped pattern with respect to age. This is true 
whether one considers case A (educational expenditures treated as a govern- 
ment purchase) or case B (educational expenditures treated as a transfer pay- 
ment). All amounts in this and subsequent tables are expressed in  1995 U.S. 
dollars. 
Although the accounts all rise and then fall with age, the absolute levels of 
the accounts vary considerably across countries. Much of this variation-for 
example, the difference between U.S. and Thai accounts-reflects  the level of 
development. But there is great variation even among developed countries. 
Take case A, and compare the accounts of 40-year-old Germans and those of 
40-year-old Swedes. The Swedish age 40 account equals $228,500, which is 
43 percent larger than the corresponding $160,100 German age 40 account. 
The difference between the two accounts reflects the much higher net transfers 
paid to older Germans compared to older Swedes. Or compare the 70-year-old 
Norwegian account with the corresponding Japanese account. The Norwegian 
account is $135,000 smaller than the Japanese account. 
These big cross-country differences in the accounts should not obscure their 
similarities. Take Italy and Canada. Both countries have quite similar accounts 
through roughly age 25. But beyond this age, the Italians have much smaller 
accounts than do the Canadians. Or compare the German and French accounts, 
on the one hand, or the Argentine and Brazilian accounts, on the other. They 
are quite similar across all ages. 
There are four features of  the accounts that particularly merit comment. Table 4.2  Generational  Accounts, 1995 (thousands of 1995 U.S. dollars) 
United States  Japan  Germany  I*Y  Canada  Thailand 
Generation’s 






























































-  104.6 


































































-  150.2 




















-  180.7 
-  150.2 

















-  103.1 
-  142.0 
-  138.3 




















-  142.0 
-  138.3 




















































8.3  5.9 
9.6  6.8 
10.9  8.9 
12.3  11.3 
13.6  13.2 
14.2  14.1 
14.1  14.1 
13.3  13.3 
11.8  11.8 
10.0  10.0 
8.1  8.1 
6.2  6.2 
4.8  4.8 
3.7  3.7 
2.8  2.8 
2.1  2.1 
1.5  1.5 
1 .o  1 .o 
0.5  0.5 
1  .O  -1.5 
-7.3  -7.4 
-88.0  -125.4 Australia  Denmark  Netherlands  New Zealand  France 














-  12.7 
-  17.6 
-16.1 

















-  17.6 
-16.1 















-  143 
-  172 
-186 
-  194 
-202 
-  202 
-  49 












-  143 
-  172 
-186 
-194 
-  202 
-202 























































































-  12.5 
-  134.7 
-  197.0 
-  199.9 
-151.5 
-  162.1 
-93.9 












-  12.5 
-  134.7 
~  197.0 
-  199.9 
-151.5 
-  162.1 
-93.9 
















































96.3 Table 4.2  (cuntinued) 
Norway  Portugal  Sweden  Argentina  Belgium  Brazil 
Generation’s 







































-  170.6 
-  179.8 
-  170.0 
-  155.1 
-  139.4 
















-  135.3 
-  170.6 
-  179.6 
-  170.0 
-155.1 
-  139.4 


















































































































13.9  93.5 
15.7  132.4 
20.3  170.1 
26.3  210.5 
30.8  242.3 
31.6  272.5 
28.2  278.6 
21.6  259.3 
12.6  215.5 
1.5  149.3 
-11.3  65.1 
-25.2  -34.6 
-39.9  -130.6 
-42.9  -165.7 
-43.0  -172.4 
-41.2  -163.7 
-34.3  -153.1 
-32.5  -138.6 
-7.1  -119.0 
24.3  147.8 
10.4  54.2 













-  130.6 
-  165.7 
-  172.4 
-  163.7 
-153.1 
-  138.6 


















































Note: A: Educational expenditure treated as government consumption. B: Educational expenditure treated as government transfers and distributed by age groups. 81  An International Comparison of Generational Accounts 
Table 4.3  Absolute and Relative Levels of Per Capita GDP, 1995 
Per Capita GDP as a  Per Capita GDP 




















































Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1997 (Washington, D.C., 1997). 
First, the Japanese, Germans, Swedes, Danes, Dutch, French, and Belgians are 
confronting their young and middle-aged citizens with strikingly high levels 
of remaining lifetime net taxes. At age 25, the respective case A accounts of 
these  countries  are  $295,200, $309,700, $295,200, $25 1,000, $237,300, 
$321,900,  and $272,500.  These values are large not only in absolute terms, but 
also relative to each of the countries’ annual average labor earnings. They are 
also much higher than the corresponding $175,400 age 25 U.S. account. 
Second, with the exception of Thailand, which does not yet have a pay-as- 
you-go social security system, the accounts of  all the countries are negative 
after age 65. In a number of the countries they are negative at earlier ages. For 
example, Brazil’s accounts turn negative at age 50. Third, certain countries are 
much more generous to their current elderly than are others. Comparing Aus- 
tralia and Norway makes this point. Both countries have quite similar case A 
accounts prior to age 40. But for older cohorts, Norway has substantially lower 
levels of  net taxation. Indeed, at age 75 the Norwegian account is $154,000 
less than the Australian account. Fourth, as expected, the case B accounts are 
much lower for all countries at younger ages since educational expenditures 
are allocated to children and young adults on whose behalf the expenditure is 
made. For example, in Canada the case B account for 5-year-olds is $66,400- 
less than half the corresponding case A account. 
Table 4.4 repeats table 4.2 except it scales each country’s accounts by  the 
ratio of U.S. per capita GDP to the country’s per capita GDP. Table 4.3 reports 
the absolute levels of  1995  per capita GDP for each country as well as the Table 4.4  Scaled Generational  Accounts, 1995 (thousands of 1995 U.S. dollars) 
United States  Japan  Germany  Italy  Canada  Thailand 
Generation’s 


























86.3  28.5 
102.0  35.3 
121.7  71.4 
144.6  115.0 
168.7  159.3 
175.4  172.7 
170.0  168.7 
157.5  156.9 
135.7  135.6 
101.3  101.3 
56.4  56.4 
4.0  4.0 
-51.7  -51.7 
-96.0  -96.0 
-104.6  -104.6 
-101.9  -101.9 
-89.5  -89.5 
-74.4  -74.4 
-56.7  -56.7 
130.4  73.9 
44.1  45.3 























89.1  221.8 
111.0  261.2 
165.3  314.2 
228.8  387.0 
314.3  448.4 
360.4  416.3 
363.6  365.3 
350.9  301.6 
322.1  215.2 
278.0  126.3 
211.4  -5.6 
120.9  -132.9 
14.5  -246.8 
-58.2  -277.8 
-54.7  -242.9 
-44.0  -201.9 
-32.6  -147.3 
-22.2  -91.4 
-11.8  -4.3 
390.0  425.8 
300.9  204.0 























155.2  92.9 
180.6  109.1 
209.4  152.7 
242.4  215.9 
262.9  253.5 
250.5  249.6 
210.9  210.9 
154.2  154.2 
86.1  86.1 
14.5  14.5 
-63.6  -63.6 
-140.1  -140.1 
-  192.9  -  192.9 
-  187.9  -  187.9 
-  159.6  -  159.6 
-  128.7  -  128.7 
-98.1  -98.1 
-71.6  -71.6 
-10.1  -10.1 
359.8  285.2 
204.6  197.1 














-  108.2 
-113.8 




















-  106.8 
-112.3 
-  107.8 
-  101.9 
-87.5 
-  13.9 
74.  I 
3.4 
3.1 
29.7  21.1 
34.4  24.4 
39.1  31.9 
44.1  40.5 
48.7  47.3 
50.9  50.5 
50.5  50.5 
47.7  47.7 
42.3  42.3 
35.8  35.8 
29.0  29.0 
22.2  22.2 
17.2  17.2 
13.3  13.3 
10.0  10.0 
7.5  7.5 
5.4  5.4 
3.6  3.6 
1.8  1.8 
3.6  -5.4 
-26.2  -26.5 
-88.0  -125.4 Australia  Denmark  Netherlands  New Zealand  France 



























































































-  139.9 
-  152.9 
-  160.8 
-  157.8 














-  123.7 
-  139.9 
-  152.9 
-159.7 


















































-  16.0 
-  172.9 
-252.9 
-256.6 
-  194.5 
-208.1 
-  120.5 













-  172.9 
-252.9 
-256.6 
-  194.5 
-208.1 



























In  percent 
(continued) 




















96.3 Table 4.4  (continued) 
Norway  Portugal  Sweden  Argentina  Belgium  Brazil 
Generation’s 










































-  190.8 
-171.5 




1.7  131.5 
-9.2  142.8 
18.1  155.3 
71.8  169.4 
130.8  183.0 
156.3  181.1 
159.4  159.6 
142.9  127.7 
111.1  84.5 
47.8  33.8 
-27.4  -22.6 
-89.8  -72.1 
-166.4  -100.2 
-209.8  -105.1 
-220.9  -90.9 
-209.1  -70.9 
-190.8  -52.8 
-171.5  -32.8 
-  150.8  -8.7 
70.5  210.0 
68.8  78.5 





































-  142.4 
-  116.0 






177.3  73.7 
204.9  82.1 
237.1  93.2 
307.6  105.8 
385.9  110.4 
413.7  108.8 
406.0  98.6 
376.0  74.0 
329.7  44.2 
255.9  6.8 
152.3  -35.7 
23.4  -81.8 
-96.7  -129.5 
-161.4  -139.3 
-  142.4  -  139.6 
-116.0  -133.8 
-84.6  -111.4 
-48.3  -105.5 
-9.5  -23.1 
122.0  117.2 
-55.3  43.5 
-31.2  58.6 
45.1  116.4 
51.0  164.9 
65.9  211.8 
85.4  262.1 
100.0  301.7 
102.6  339.4 
91.6  346.9 
70.1  322.9 
40.9  268.4 
4.9  185.9 
-36.7  81.1 
-81.8  -43.1 
-  129.5  -  162.6 
-139.3  -206.4 
-139.6  -214.7 
-133.8  -203.9 
-111.4  -190.7 
-  105.5  -  172.6 
-23.1  -148.2 
78.9  184.1 
33.8  67.5 

















-  190.7 
-  172.6 
















-  140.0 
-  166.5 
-  164.5 
-  110.5 
-70.5 
-48.0 
















-  140.0 
-  166.5 
-  164.5 
-  110.5 
-70.5 
-48.0 





Nore: A: Educational expenditure treated as government consumption. B: Educational expenditure treated as government transfers and distributed by age groups. 85  An International Comparison of Generational Accounts 
ratios of these living standards to 1995 U.S. per capita GDP. Living standards 
are measured on a purchasing price parity basis. In absolute terms, the coun- 
tries’ living standards range from $5,400 in Brazil to $26,980 in the United 
States. Brazil’s living standard is only a fifth of that of the United States. Japan’s 
living standard, in contrast, is 82 percent of the U.S. standard. 
Scaling the accounts is informative. It shows remarkable differences across 
countries in the extent of  net taxation even after one has taken into account 
differences in levels of income. Take 40-year-olds. The largest case A account 
for this cohort is found in Japan. It equals $322,100. The smallest-equal  to 
$42,300-is  found in Thailand. The age 40 U.S. case A account is $135,700. 
In addition to Japan, Germany, Canada, Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
France, Sweden, and Belgium have higher scaled age 40 generational accounts 
than the United States. Next consider 65-year-olds. The smallest age 65 scaled 
account  is  -$277,800  and  belongs  to  Germany,  whereas  the  largest- 
$13,300-is  that of Thailand. The age 65 U.S. account is -$96,000.  In addi- 
tion to Germany, the age 65 accounts of  Italy, Canada, Denmark, the Nether- 
lands, France, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Argentina, Belgium, and Brazil are 
less than that of the United States. Finally, consider newborns. The U.S. case 
A account is $86,300. This is less than one-third the corresponding scaled 
Swedish newborn account of $268,300. It is also smaller, and in most cases a 
lot smaller, than the scaled newborn accounts of Japan, Germany, Italy, Can- 
ada, Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, France, Norway, Por- 
tugal, and Belgium. 
4.4  Imbalances in Generational Policy 
The comparison of the generational account facing newborns with that fac- 
ing future generations indicates the degree of imbalance in generational policy. 
These accounts can be found in the “age 0” and the “future generations” rows 
of table 4.2. The last two rows of table 4.2 show the imbalance in both absolute 
and percentage terms. Take the United States: The case A generational account 
of  newborn Americans is $86,300, whereas that facing future Americans is 
$130,400. The difference between these numbers-$44,1OO-is  the absolute 
imbalance. This absolute imbalance is 51.1 percent of the account of current 
newborns; that is, unless currently living Americans are forced to pay more in 
net taxes or unless government in the United States can curtail its purchases, 
future Americans will face net tax rates that are more than 50 percent higher 
than those facing current newborn Americans! The case B absolute imbalance 
is quite close to the case A imbalance, but since the case B generational ac- 
count of newborns is only about one-third the size of the corresponding case 
A account, the case B percentage imbalance is much larger than the case A 
percentage imbalance-indeed,  three times larger! 
Whether one considers the case A or case B imbalance, one thing is clear: 
there is a very  large imbalance in US. generational policy. But the United 86  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Willi Leibfritz 
States is certainly not alone in placing the next generation in harm’s way. Ac- 
cording to table 4.2, Japan, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Bel- 
gium have larger percentage imbalances than the United States under case A, 
and Japan, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway have larger percent- 
age imbalances under case B ! 
The country with the largest absolute imbalances is Japan. Its case A and 
case B imbalances are $242,800 and $246,400, respectively. These amounts 
are startling. If future Japanese are asked to pay these sums in addition to what 
current newborn Japanese are now being asked to pay, they will, in effect, be 
handed a net tax at birth in excess of $300,000. To view this number in a dif- 
ferent light, compound it to age 20 at the 5 percent real discount. The resulting 
amount exceeds $800,000 and represents the effective lifetime net tax bill that 
would be handed to future Japanese upon entering the workforce. 
In percentage terms, the Japanese imbalance is 169 percent in case A and 
338 percent in case B. In other words, absent some other, quite dramatic fiscal 
adjustment, future Japanese face lifetime net tax rates that are 2.7 to 4.4 times 
the lifetime net tax  rates facing current  newborn Japanese. These findings, 
which are detailed in Chapter 19, were developed in a year-long Bank of Japan 
study by Yukinobu Kitamura and Hiroshi Yoshida of the Bank of Japan work- 
ing in collaboration with Noriyuki Takayama, one of Japan’s leading academic 
economists. They are remarkable in light of the relatively high level of gener- 
ational accounts facing young  and middle-aged  Japanese and the relatively 
small (in absolute value) negative accounts of Japanese elderly. The explana- 
tion for Japan’s particularly severe generational imbalance lies in its particu- 
larly rapid rate of aging. 
Although Japan has the worst generational imbalance, the German, Italian, 
Dutch, and Brazilian imbalances are also grave. In these countries, the tax bur- 
den on future generations will have to rise by more than 75 percent under case 
A and by more than 100 percent under case B unless those now alive pay more 
or their governments  spend less. Another five countries have severe imbal- 
ances: the United States, Norway, Portugal, Argentina, and Belgium. In these 
countries, the growth-adjusted fiscal burdens facing future generations are 50 
to 75 percent larger than those facing current newborns. 
Three countries-  Australia, Denmark, and France-have  substantial imbal- 
ances that leave their descendents facing 30 to 50 percent higher lifetime net 
tax  rates.  Canada appears to be essentially in generational balance. The re- 
maining three countries-New  Zealand, Thailand, and Sweden-have  nega- 
tive imbalances;2  that is, their policies, if maintained, would leave future gener- 
ations facing  lower  lifetime net tax rates  than current newborns. The main 
reason is that in these countries the aging of the population is less rapid and 
2. In contrast to the Swedish findings reported here, the latest generational accounting for Swe- 
den by  Lundvik, Liith, and Raffelhiischen (1998) reports a very  severe imbalance in  Swedish 
generational policy. As of the time of publication of this volume, the precise explanation for the 
different findings had yet to be determined, although different assumptions concerning baseline 
fiscal policy appear to be very important. 87  An International Comparison of  Generational Accounts 
Table 4.5  Official Deficit and Debt as a Share of  GDP, 1995 
Primary  Gross  Net 






















































































Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, unless otherwise indicated. 
Notes:  Deficits and debts are for general government (federal, state, local, and social security 
sectors) and are derived from national income accounts. Primary deficit is the official deficit minus 
interest on net debt. Net debt refers to gross liabilities (gross debt) less financial assets. Negative 
values indicate surpluses. 
“From World Bank, World Development Report 1997 (Washington, D.C,  1997), central govern- 
ment current deficit. 
the government is currently following a strict course of fiscal consolidation. In 
these countries, intergenerational equity could be restored by reducing (some- 
what) the tax burden on currently living generations. 
Australia is another country whose recent policy measures have had a sig- 
nificant  impact  on  its generational  accounts.  There, a  compulsory  savings 
scheme has been established that leads individuals to accumulate savings for 
retirement,  while public pensions  are steadily reduced;  these measures in- 
creased the net taxes of current generations (as pension benefits of newborns 
were reduced) while net taxes of future generations declined. However, during 
the transition from the pay-as-you-go pension  system to a privately funded 
system, current young Australians  have to finance both the pensions of the 
currently retired generations and the accumulation of reserves for their own 
retirement; that is, they have to “pay twice.” 
4.5  Generational Accounting versus Deficit Accounting 
It is interesting to compare generational accounting’s assessment of  fiscal 
sustainability with that suggested by  official deficits and debts. Table 4.5 re- 
cords, as a share of  GDP, government deficits, primary deficits (taxes minus 
noninterest expenditures), levels of gross debt (gross government liabilities), 88  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Willi Leibfritz 
and levels of net debt (gross government liabilities minus the government’s fi- 
nancial assets) for our 17 countries, Consider Japan and Norway: Although Ja- 
pan has the largest and Norway one of the largest generational imbalances, the 
two countries have the lowest ratios of net debt to GDP. Indeed, Norway’s net 
debt is negative; the Norwegian government has positive  net wealth. If  one 
considers gross rather than net debt, Japan’s and Norway’s debt levels are still 
relatively  modest. And if one considers deficits, one finds that the Japanese 
deficit is lower than that of Canada and that Norway is running a surplus. The 
correlation of generational imbalance with the primary deficit is no better. Nor- 
way’s  primary deficit is negative,  and Japan’s is lower  than  Sweden’s, even 
though the Swedes have a negative generational imbalance. 
The complete lack of  any consistent relationship between nations’ genera- 
tional imbalances and their deficit or debt positions is not surprising given that 
from a theoretical perspective, there is no intrinsic connection between the two 
measures. Nonetheless, this finding should be of interest to those who believe 
deficit or debt levels represent useful criteria for assessing a country’s fiscal 
responsibility. Two institutions that immediately come to mind in this regard 
are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union. The IMF 
routinely uses budget deficit targets in determining structural adjustment poli- 
cies for its client countries. And the European  Union  has adopted a deficit 
target  as the principal requirement  for  membership  in  its proposed  single- 
currency monetary union. 
In  considering  the  desirability  and  sustainability  of  European  monetary 
union, it is worth bearing the following in mind: imposing higher net taxes on 
current generations by printing money (and exacting a seigniorage tax) is one 
of the easiest “solutions” to the major generational imbalances facing the vari- 
ous countries who are now likely to join the union. Because their imbalances 
are quite different, each country will wish to turn on the printing presses to a 
different degree. This may place significant stress on the union and lead to its 
eventual collapse. The other and better solution is, however, that countries ad- 
dress the roots of the problems by implementing major fiscal reforms, particu- 
larly in old-age pension systems. 
4.6  Sensitivity of the Results 
Estimates of generational accounts are based on the assumption that except 
for demographic influences,  no other fundamental  changes in the economy 
occur. But with a given working-age population, labor supply could increase 
if (female) labor participation increases, and this would raise labor tax reve- 
nues and reduce transfers. Furthermore, if private saving increases (which may 
result  from a shift toward  privately  funded pension  systems), receipts from 
capital income taxes would rise. As illustrated for the Netherlands (chap. 14), 
the combined effects of increasing the labor participation rate of women and 
increasing aggregate savings could significantly raise the future tax base and 89  An International Comparison of Generational Accounts 
reduce the generational imbalance. Also, if population aging were slower than 
assumed here (e.g., if fertility rates were higher or if there were more immigra- 
tion of  young workers), the imbalance against future generations would be 
reduced. This would result from a larger number of taxpayers available to help 
finance government expenditures. The impact of the various demographic as- 
sumptions on generational accounts is illustrated in  some country chapters 
(e.g., the assumption of fertility rates in chap. 13, on Italy, and the assumption 
of immigration in chap. 6, on Australia). 
The results are also sensitive to assumptions about productivity growth and 
the discount rate. For a given discount rate, higher productivity growth in- 
creases the absolute amounts of  net tax payments of both existing and future 
generations. For a given productivity growth rate, a higher discount rate re- 
duces these present value amounts. Table 4.6 shows case A generational imbal- 
ances for three discount rate assumptions (3, 5, and 7 percent) and three pro- 
ductivity growth assumptions (1, 1.5, and 2 percent). Table 4.7 does the same 
for case B. 
It is clear from the two tables that the absolute sizes of the accounts of cur- 
rent newborns as well as future generations are fairly sensitive, particularly to 
the choice of  discount rates. On the other hand, the values of both variables 
move in the same direction in response to changes in the rates of productivity 
growth and interest. Consequently, the absolute generational imbalance in 
many countries is rather invariant to the choice of these rates. In Japan, for ex- 
ample, the absolute case A imbalance across the nine combinations of growth 
and discount rates ranges from $220,900 to $294,500. Or take Thailand, whose 
absolute case A imbalance ranges from -$6,400  to -$8,400. 
Even in countries where the absolute imbalance is fairly sensitive to the 
choice of  growth and discount rates, the basic message of  generational ac- 
counting may be the same. France is a good example. Its absolute imbalance 
ranges from $33,600 to $167,800. But the $33,600 imbalance, arising from the 
assumption of a 7 percent discount rate and a 1  percent growth rate, represents 
a percentage imbalance of 49 percent, and the $167,800 imbalance represents 
a percentage imbalance of 71 percent; hence, both sets of parameters indicate 
that future Frenchmen and Frenchwomen face much higher rates of  lifetime 
net taxation than do current newborns assuming current newborns face, over 
their lifetimes, the panoply of French taxes and transfers now in existence. 
Another message emerging from tables 4.6 and 4.7 is that the sensitivity of 
the generational accounts to growth and interest rate assumptions depends on 
the country in question. Norway makes this clear. The Norwegian absolute 
imbalance switches from a small negative to a large positive value depending 
on parameter values. For Norway the choice of the discount rate is particularly 
critical. With the base-case 1.5 percent growth rate and 5 percent discount rate, 
Norway has a sizable generational imbalance. But with a 7 percent discount 
rate and a  1.5 labor productivity growth rate, Norway is roughly in genera- 
tional balance. Table 4.6  Generational  Accounts: Sensitivity to Growth and Discount Rates, Case A (thousands of 1995 U.S. dollars) 
g=l  g = 1.5  g=2 
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36.9 Table 4.6  (continued) 
g=1  g = 1.5  g=2 





























































































































Nore: g is productivity growth (percent); r is discount rate (percent). Table 4.7  Generational  Accounts: Sensitivity to Growth and Discount Rates, Case B (thousands of 1995 US.  dollars) 
g=l  g = 1.5  g=2 



























































































































































































-6.8 Table 4.7  (continued) 
g=l  g = 1.5  g=2 
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Nore; g is productivity growth (percent); r is discount rate (percent). 96  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Willi Leibfritz 
Table 4.8  Sources of Generational Imbalance (percentage imbalance) 
No Demographic 
Base Case  Change  Zero Debt 
























































-  143.4 
20.0 















-  174.6 
62.4 












































Note: A: Educational expenditure treated as government consumption. B: Educational expenditure 
treated as government transfers and distributed by age groups. 
“Percentage imbalance is not defined. Newborns’ account is -  $17,800  and future generations’ 
account is $26,400. 
bPercentage imbalance is not defined. Newborns’ account is  -$17,800  and future generations’ 
account is -$2,300. 
4.7  Sources of Generational Imbalances 
Table  4.8 asks how  much of  the imbalance in generational policy in the 
various countries can be traced to the country’s demographic transition and 
how much can be traced to its official net debt. The demographics experiment 
considers how large the generational imbalance would be were each country 
to experience no change whatsoever over time in the size or age-sex composi- 
tion of its population. The zero-debt experiment sets official net debt to zero 
and recalculates the generational imbalance. 
Demographics make a very substantial difference to the imbalance in almost 
all of the countries. The reason is that the countries are aging and the elderly 
are net beneficiaries of  the governments’ tax-transfer systems. For instance, 
Argentina’s imbalance is essentially wiped out if there is no change in demo- 
graphics. The same is true for Germany, the United States, Denmark, Italy, the 
Netherlands, France,  and Norway.  In  the case of Japan, zero demographic 
change would eliminate about  three-quarters of  the case A  imbalance and 
about four-fifths of the case B imbalance. 
Eliminating the government official net debt has a range of impacts on gen- 97  An International Comparison of  Generational Accounts 
erational imbalances. Eliminating official debt would have a minor impact on 
the Japanese imbalance. The same goes for the imbalances in Norway and 
Brazil. For the United States, the absence of  net debt would eliminate only 
about one-third of  the outstanding imbalance. About half  of  the imbalance 
would be eliminated in Germany, Argentina, France, Australia, and Italy. The 
majority, then, of the 17 countries would still face very significant generational 
imbalances even were there no official net debt. This provides yet more evi- 
dence that official deficit and debt figures fall far short of being sufficient sta- 
tistics for generational policy. 
4.8  Restoring Generational Balance? 
Apart from the moral dimension of restoring generational balance, doing so 
represents an economic imperative. Countries that take no action to achieve 
generational balance will find their generational imbalances worsening over 
time. Why? Because failure to act in the short run means permitting each new 
generation that is born in the short run to experience the status quo policy and 
thus pay the same lifetime net taxes as those now alive. In terms of generational 
accounting, this confronts generations born in the more distant future with an 
even larger lifetime net tax rate. But there is a limit-100  percent-to  the rate 
of lifetime net taxation; that is, governments cannot extract more from people 
in net taxes than they earn. Moreover, the marginal tax rates that would be 
associated with trying to collect anything close to a 100 percent average net 
tax would eliminate people’s interest in working and, in the process, the gov- 
ernment’s net tax base. 
Eliminating generational imbalances can be done in only two ways.  The 
government can either force those now alive to pay higher net taxes by raising 
their taxes or by cutting their transfer payments or it can reduce the time path 
of its spending. Table 4.9 explores each of these alternatives. It considers (1) 
immediately and permanently reducing the time path of government spending 
by a fixed percentage, (2) immediately and permanently cutting all government 
transfers by  a fixed percentage, (3) immediately and permanently raising all 
taxes by a fixed percentage, and (4) immediately and permanently raising all 
income taxes by  a fixed percentage. These percentages are determined such 
that the residual growth-adjusted net tax bill facing future generations is the 
same as that facing newborns. Thus each of these policy alternatives achieves 
generational balance on its own. Obviously, combinations of the policy instru- 
ments could achieve the same end, and if the instruments were combined, less 
would be required of any single policy instrument. 
In considering the magnitude of  these alternative immediate fiscal adjust- 
ments, it is important to bear in mind that larger adjustments are needed if the 
policies under consideration are not enacted immediately. It is also important 
to note that the different types of adjustments would affect different currently 
living generations differently. For example, an income tax hike would hurt 
current workers more than would a cut in transfer payments. 98  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Willi Leibfritz 
Table 4.9  Alternative Ways to Achieve Generational Balance 
Cut in  Cut in 
Government  Government  Increase in  Increase in 
Purchases  Transfers  All Taxes  Income Tax 


















18.7  27.0  19.8  20.3  10.5  10.8  23.8 
26.0  29.5  28.6  25.3  15.5  15.5  53.6 
21.1  25.9  17.6  14.1  9.5  9.5  29.5 
52.7  87.9  41.0  40.0  66.7  61.4  198.4 
0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0. I  0.0 
-38.1  -47.7  -185.1  -114.2  -25.0  -25.0  -81.7 
8.8  10.2  12.1  9.1  5.1  4.8  8.5 
9.9  29.0  4.7  4.5  3.4  4.0  5.8 
21.0  28.7  21.4  22.3  8.5  8.9  14.9 
-1.0  -1.6  -0.8  -0.6  -0.4  -0.4  -0.8 
17.2  22.2  11.5  9.8  7.1  6.9  66.0 
11.5  9.9  9.4  8.1  7.4  6.3  11.3 
7.6  9.8  9.6  7.5  4.2  4.2  13.3 
-7.6  -8.7  -7.7  -6.0  -3.4  -3.1  -9.3 
24.6  29.1  16.8  11.0  10.7  8.4  97.1 
11.2  12.4  6.0  4.6  3.7  3.1  11.7 


















Note: A: Educational expenditure treated as government consumption. B: Educational expenditure treated 
as government transfers and distributed by age groups. 
Restoring the balance between newborns and future generations would re- 
quire immediate and permanent cuts in government purchases of  more than 
one-half in Italy, of about one-quarter in Japan, Argentina, and Brazil, and of 
about one-fifth in the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and France. 
These are very sizable adjustments. Their enactment would materially alter the 
official deficits now being reported by these countries. In the United States, 
the government sector (federal, state, and local) deficit would fall by roughly 
$200 billion. The U.S. federal surplus is now small. Thus achieving genera- 
tional balance in the United States requires immediately running what would 
be, from a historical perspective, huge official surpluses. 
Not all countries would need to cut spending to achieve generational bal- 
ance. Thailand, Sweden, and New Zealand need to raise government spend- 
ing-by  about 40 percent, 8 percent, and 1 percent, respectively-since  their 
baseline generational imbalances are negati~e.~  Another point is that the spend- 
3. Lundvik, Luth, and Raffelhuschen’s (1998) figures for Sweden, corresponding to table 4.9 
above, are 34.6, 48.8, 21.2, 18.0,  14.8, 14.8, 40.3, and 40.3. These figures tell a dramatically 
different story than those reported in this study. Sartor’s (1998) update of Italy’s generational ac- 
counts, based on Italy’s recent dramatic pension reform, shows a much smaller generational imbal- 
ance in Italy. For example, the case B 61.4 percent requisite increase in all taxes is now less than 
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ing adjustment needed to achieve balance is quite similar across alternatives 
A and B; that is, how one allocates educational expenditures does not matter 
much to the adjustments needed to achieve generational balance. 
An  alternative to cutting government spending is cutting all transfer pay- 
ments be they govemment-provided health care, unemployment benefits, so- 
cial security pensions, or welfare benefits:  Achieving generational balance in 
this way means transfer cuts of roughly two-fifths in Italy, one-quarter in Japan, 
and one-fifth in the United States, the Netherlands, and Brazil. For other coun- 
tries, the requisite cut is smaller. Germany’s case A required transfer cut is 17.6 
percent. The corresponding U.S. cut is 19.8 percent. Germany’s cut is smaller 
because transfer payments relative to GDP are somewhat larger in Germany 
than they are in the United States. Thailand‘s current transfers are so small 
relative to GDP that they would need to be more than doubled to achieve gener- 
ational balance. 
Restoring generational balance in Italy through higher taxes translates into 
more than a 60 percent across-the-board tax hike. The corresponding general 
tax hike needed for generational balance in the United States, Japan, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Brazil, and Argentina ranges from 9 to 16 percent. In France 
and Norway, a roughly 7 percent hike is needed. Portugal, Australia, Denmark, 
Canada, and Belgium require about a 2 to 5 percent hike. In Thailand, New 
Zealand, and Sweden across-the-board tax cuts of about 25 percent, 0.4 per- 
cent, and 3 percent, respectively, would produce generational balance. 
The corresponding income tax hikes needed to achieve generational balance 
have a much greater range across countries because the ratio of income taxes 
to GDP varies more across countries than does the ratio of total taxes to GDP. 
In Italy, which has a relatively small ratio of  income tax to GDP, almost a 
tripling of  the income tax rate would be needed to achieve generational bal- 
ance. This assumes no erosion in the income tax base. If  one were to take 
such erosion into account, it might well be the case that achieving generational 
balance in Italy solely through a hike in the income tax is infeasible. 
Argentina, Brazil, and France would also need to raise their income taxes 
dramatically to bring their accounts into balance. The requisite income tax 
hikes for these countries range from 64 to 97 percent. Japan is not far behind. 
It would need over a 50 percent income tax hike. The corresponding U.S.  and 
German income tax hikes range from 24 to 30 percent. These tax increases are 
modest compared to what would be needed in Italy, but they would be viewed 
as enormously painful by current generations of Americans and Germans. In- 
deed, the focus of U.S. politicians is now on cutting, not raising, federal in- 
come taxes. For other countries-Belgium,  Portugal, Norway, Australia, Den- 
mark, and Canada-a  more modest income tax hike would do the trick. At the 
other end of the imbalance spectrum is Thailand, which would have to cut its 
4. In the case of  social security pensions, the cuts might come in the form of raising early and 
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income taxes by 82 ptrcent to achieve balance. Sweden could achieve balance 
with a 9 percent income tax cut, and New Zealand with a 1 percent cut. 
4.9  Summary and Conclusion 
Policymakers take official budget deficits and debts as their primary fiscal in- 
dicators. For example, European countries are currently aiming at budget def- 
icits below 3 percent of GDP-the  target for European monetary union mem- 
bership-while  others are aiming at balancing their budgets over the medium 
term. Such deficit reductions may succeed in stabilizing debt-to-GDP ratios in 
the near future, but they do not represent fiscally sustainable policies that will 
achieve generational balance-a  situation in which today’s  and tomorrow’s 
children pay,  in net taxes, the same share of  their lifetime labor incomes. In 
fact, by focusing on budget balance, rather than generational balance,  many 
countries appear to be doing too little to achieve generational balance. This 
makes their long-term fiscal situations worse. The reason is that the longer a 
country waits to adjust, the more painful the ultimate adjustment will be. And 
adjusting too little in the short run is a form of waiting too long to adjust. 
The international generational accounts presented here are quite shocking. 
The world‘s  leading industrial powers-the  United  States, Japan,  and Ger- 
many-all  have severe imbalances in their generational policies. Unless cur- 
rently living members of these countries pay more in net taxes or unless these 
countries dramatically cut their purchases of goods and services, future Ameri- 
cans, Japanese, and Germans will face dramatically higher rates of lifetime net 
taxation. Leaving current Americans untouched  and maintaining the current 
projected time path of government purchases will leave future Americans col- 
lectively  facing roughly 50 percent higher net tax rates  over their lifetimes 
than those confronting a newborn American based on current U.S. tax-transfer 
policy. For future Germans, the imbalance, if  not rectified,  means they  will 
face lifetime net tax rates that are roughly twice as high as those now in place. 
And for future Japanese, policy inaction means lifetime net tax rates that are 
more than 2.5 times as high as current values. 
These three countries are not alone in running imbalanced generational poli- 
cies. Of the 17 countries examined here, five-Japan,  Italy, Germany, the Neth- 
erlands,  and  Brazil-have  extreme  imbalances.  Another  five-the  United 
States, Norway, Portugal, Argentina, and Belgium-have  severe imbalances. 
Three countries-Australia,  Denmark, and France-have  substantial imbal- 
ances. Canada appears to be essentially in generational balance. The remaining 
three countries-New  Zealand, Thailand, and Sweden have negative imbal- 
ances; that is, their policies, if maintained, would leave future generations fac- 
ing lower lifetime net tax rates than current newborns.s 
There are a range of  policy options that can be used to restore fiscal sus- 
5. Again, the Swedish findings are strongly contradicted by Lundvik, Luth, and Raffelhiischen 
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tainability and generational equity. But for most of the 17 countries, their medi- 
cine, no matter  how they  take it, will be very unpleasant.  Since conditions 
differ substantially across the various countries, the best combination of fiscal 
responses will be country specific. Although each country may respond differ- 
ently, those with sizable generational imbalances all need to act immediately. 
Generational accounting’s fundamental message is that who pays the govern- 
ment’s bills is a zero-sum game. The less those now alive pay, the larger the 
amounts their descendants will pay. Delay not only makes the situation worse, 
it also leaves everyone in society uncertain about how long-term fiscal prob- 
lems will ultimately be resolved. 
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